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Russian foreign policy has become more consistent and predictable since Yevgeni 
Primakov succeeded Andrei Kozyrev as foreign minister in January 1996. Moscow's 
diplomacy today shows a tendency toward greater integration between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the military-industrial complex (VPK), the 
fuel and energy complex (TEK), and the unreformed security and intelligence services.
Primakov appears to have reinforced the erratic, often seemingly irrational, anti-Western 
outbursts of President Yel'tsin. Breaking from the mere diplomacy of Kozyrev, he brings 
a statescraft reminiscent of Primakov's two great mentors, Andrei Gromyko and Yuri 
Andropov. The government is not yet singing from the same sheet, as demonstrated by 
the frequent public differences between the ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs on 
NATO expansion and China, where Primakov consistently has taken a harder line than 
the generals. Nevertheless, the trend has been in Primakov's favor.
Appointed to the plaudits of Communists and ultranationalists, Primakov had set this 
course from behind the scenes as director of the External Intelligence Service (Sluzhba 
vneshnei razvedki, SVR), the foreign branch of the former KGB to which he was 
appointed in September 1991. He won widespread respect shepherding a demoralized 
SVR through a precarious period of transition, and benefited particularly after the 
February 1994 arrest of Aldrich Ames, the KGB and SVR penetration agent within the 
CIA. Revelation of this recruiting achievement was wildly popular in Russia.
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By September 1994, it became clear that the SVR had eclipsed the foreign ministry 
policy when Primakov warned in a major address from Kozyrev's press center that 
Moscow's re-domination of the territory of the former Soviet Union was inevitable. (1) 
Primakov announced a grand strategy: Russia would get its own house in order by 
attempting to restore hegemony over Soviet territory; to challenge American strength 
where limited resources would permit, specifically to undermine expansion of the NATO 
alliance; and to rebuild relations with radical regimes in the Middle East (mostly terror-
supporting states, as listed by the US Congress) as well as with the People's Republic 
of China.
The strategy turned Russia from its courtship of Western civilization toward support of 
the Asiatic despotism with which Primakov has been more comfortable. All the while, 
making very few concessions, Primakov has courted the West by continuing, at least on 
the surface, to profess partnership in fighting nuclear proliferation, transnational crime, 
terrorism, and other crises.
This professed partnership must be evaluated by deeds. Primakov had hardly been at 
Staraya Ploshad' for two weeks when he forgave half of Libya's $16 billion debt to 
Moscow. (2) He took the action even as the International Monetary Fund, with strong 
pressure from Washington, readied to approve a three-year cash transfer of $10.2 
billion to the Russian Central Bank. He then went to Tajikistan to call for sending more 
Russian combat troops to prop up the still-Communist regime. (3) Then he systematized 
the ministry's wavering stance toward NATO by setting a line that co-opted the 
Communist and ultranationalist opposition rhetoric of the presidential campaign. During 
his first meeting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher, as if to defuse potential 
Western criticism of the new firm course, Primakov reassured journalists at a Helsinki 
news conference, "Of course reforms will continue. Of course there will be no step 
backwards. Of course democratization of our society will continue. Of course the policy 
connected with President Yel'tsin will continue." (4)
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Foreign Policy under Primakov
A survey of Russian foreign policy during Primakov's first year as foreign minister shows 
a striking contrast with Russia's optimistic, reform-minded diplomacy of 1991 and 1992.
*Near Abroad. Solidifying control over the former Soviet landmass is Moscow's greatest 
challenge. Primakov seeks international legitimacy for attempts to consolidate the "near 
abroad" under Moscow's domination, while decrying what he sees as a US-led trend 
toward a "unipolar world" that is undermining the multipolar "democratic world order." In 
a major article for Nezavisimaya gazeta, he calls for renouncing economic sanctions as 
a geopolitical tool (though this is precisely a mechanism he endorses forcibly to 
integrate the CIS), and argues that Russia's own unilateral military actions in the "near 
abroad," such as in Tajikistan and the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova or the Abkhazia 
region of Georgia, should receive international standing equal to UN and NATO 
peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. He argues that the CIS should have 
a status equal to that of NATO or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). (5) In other words, he remains a fervent believer in the "two camps" 
view of the world that characterized the Cold War.
*Arms control. Until Primakov re-established a foreign policy "party line" in the early 
days of Yel'tsin's re-election campaign, arms control agreements signed with the United 
States were not emotional political issues in Moscow. Indeed, the Ministry of Defense 
lobbied Communists and ultranationalists in the State Duma to ratify the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START II) with the United States. In February 1996, Duma 
International Affairs Committee Chairman Vladimir Lukin termed START II "extremely 
advantageous" to Russia and observed parliamentary political leaders "almost 
unanimously" supported ratification. (6) Yet within weeks, Primakov began applying 
Soviet-style linkage to START II, threatening on the eve of the April G-7 nuclear summit 
to delay the treaty's consideration in a bid to pressure the US not to build a limited 
defense system against ballistic missiles. (7) This linkage tactic soon became a 
government strategy, with the Ministry of Defense following suit and linking START II 
and other agreements to unrelated issues. Moscow also reneged on a December 1995 
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pledge to accept an anti-proliferation provision, the 31-country Wassenaar arrangement, 
to give advance notice prior to transferring high-tech goods and weapons to Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, and North Korea. (8)
*NATO expansion. While the Ministry of Defense and the presidential administration 
have alternated between denouncing and minimizing the threat of an expanded NATO, 
the foreign ministry, with some tactical adjustments, has been more rigid. Under 
Kozyrev, the ministry had not fully followed President Yel'tsin's own anti-NATO 
outbursts, perhaps in part because the president himself was not consistent.
However, Primakov, the masterful bureaucratic infighter, has battled other officials in the 
Kremlin leadership who pondered good relations with--and even possible political 
membership in--NATO. He forbade presidential Security Council Secretary Aleksandr 
Lebed' from sitting in on his meetings with Yel'tsin and publicly berated Lebed's 
successor, Ivan Rybkin. "The security council secretaries have developed a sort of 
hobby in speaking on questions of Russia's participation in NATO," Primakov told 
journalists, "but Russian foreign policy is formulated by the Foreign Ministry, and it 
maintains, as before, a negative attitude toward NATO's eastward enlargement."(9) 
Primakov's statecraft clearly shows--with intense and orchestrated denunciations of the 
dangers and ill intentions of NATO, demands for Western concessions, linkages with 
existing or pending treaties, and threats against individual prospective NATO members. 
Again, these actions could be seen prior to his appointment, but now became 
institutional. The strategy appears to be succeeding. In January 1997, the US, 
Germany, and NATO itself offered Primakov--if not an outright veto over alliance 
decisions--a set of concessions that one report called "new flexibility on arms control 
problems, greater economic assistance and a special consultative status that would 
give Russia a seat at NATO's table." (10)
*Middle East. Much of Primakov's career has been spent as an authority on the Middle 
East. He has not only retained his strong personal interest as foreign minister, but has 
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retained the old friendships, as well. He has tried, with little success to date, to inject 
himself into the Arab-Israeli peace process. Publicly, he assures Jerusalem that Russia 
would not support any country that attacked Israel, but his decades-long track record 
and his recent actions suggest otherwise. (11)
*Iran. As SVR chief, Primakov initiated a training program for Iranian intelligence 
officers. (12) As foreign minister, he has provided crucial diplomatic support to Teheran 
in response to the desires of the fossil fuel and nuclear energy sectors, the arms 
industry, and his own geopolitical inclinations. He has led an effort to foil the United 
States' efforts to isolate Iran for its support of international terrorism. The day the US 
accused Teheran of sponsoring recent acts of terrorist violence in Israel in March 1996, 
Primakov openly praised Iran for its claim to "fight" such warfare. (13) During a 
December 1996 visit to Teheran, Primakov "condemned the recent tensions in the 
region created by the United States" and alleged that "the growing US and allied military 
presence in the Persian Gulf is incompatible with peace and stability." These are far 
from calming words. During a meeting with President Hashemi Rafsanjani, Primakov 
went further, calling Russia and Iran "the two main pillars of regional peace."(14)
*Iraq. Fully reversing Moscow's principled isolation of Baghdad for launching the 
Persian Gulf War and violating subsequent international arms mandates, Primakov has 
also been working hard to lift UN sanctions on his old friend, Iraqi leader Saddam 
Hussein, whose country is reeling under an international embargo for its continued 
failure to account for and destroy its weapons of mass destruction. The reversal began 
under Kozyrev. On the surface, the policy appears simply to enable Russian oil and gas 
companies to fulfill lucrative new drilling contracts, and to provide the military industry 
with a financial boost to sell billions of dollars in back-ordered weapons. More 
substantively, an ideological, "two camps" dimension has also surfaced in Russia's 
unnecessary diplomatic gestures whose value seems merely to assert adolescent, 
Soviet-like opposition to the United States. Moscow was quick to condemn a US cruise 
missile attack on Iraqi air defense sites in response to Iraq's attempt to shoot down 
American military aircraft enforcing the UN "no-fly zone." (15)
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His old friends in the Marxist-Leninist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) continue to benefit 
from his decades of support. In 1996, as the PKK used the UN safe haven in northern 
Iraq to stage guerrilla raids into Turkey, and as a faction of Baghdad-backed Kurds 
crushed others in the safe haven, Primakov announced that Moscow would veto a 
British UN Security Council resolution in support of the victimized Kurds belonging to 
the anti-PKK Barazani and Talabani groups, under ostensible UN protection.
*Libya. Primakov has stepped up Russia's diplomatic support for Libyan leader 
Muammar Qaddafi. Since at least 1995, during Kozyrev's tenure in an apparent 
response to energy and military-industrial interests, Moscow has become the most 
powerful defender of the Libyan government's efforts to escape from United Nations 
sanctions imposed for Tripoli's involvement in the 1988 terrorist bombing of a Pan 
American jumbo jet over Lockerbie, Scotland, that killed 270 people. (16) Primakov has 
not joined the West in demanding that Libya turn over its accused intelligence agents for 
trial. Under his direction Russia voted for a Libyan-authored UN resolution to repeal 
laws directed at enterprises doing business with terrorist regimes. (17) His imprint is 
seen on Yel'tsin's behind-the-scenes activity. At the March 1996 anti-terrorism summit in 
Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, the Russian president joined Western leaders in calling for 
global unity against terrorism. Eleven days later, Yel'tsin had a personal letter hand-
delivered to Qaddafi, pledging to help lift the Lockerbie sanctions. (18) The West said 
nothing. Four months later, Primakov led the Russian delegation to the Paris G-7 
summit on terrorism and compared alleged Chechen bombers to terrorist organizations 
in Western Europe. (19)
*Cuba. Moscow maintains interests in Cuba, such as sales of arms and industrial spare 
parts and a partially built nuclear reactor at Juragua, but the real strategic interest is the 
massive, Soviet-built electronic intelligence-gathering facility outside Lourdes. Since 
1992, Russia has provided Cuba with subsidized trade concessions and credits, 
commodities, and payments for use of the Lourdes base, which currently is undergoing 
a technological upgrade. Nevertheless, Russian diplomacy seldom came to Fidel 
Castro's rescue until Primakov's appointment.
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Some Russian observers see Moscow's policy as inspired to lay the groundwork for 
using Cuba as a potential counter to NATO expansion. (20) Primakov has seized on this 
as a prod to irritate Washington. A case in point is the February 1996 Cuban shooting 
down of two unarmed American Cessna airplanes in international airspace over the 
Straits of Florida. The planes were operated by American citizens of Cuban origin who 
dropped anti-Castro leaflets on Cuban territory. When the US sought a United Nations 
condemnation of the attack, which killed the crew of both aircraft, Russia actively 
worked with China to dilute the language to ensure that the action would not be 
"condemned." (21) A foreign ministry spokesman said Moscow "deeply regrets" the 
incident, but withheld judgment about Cuban conduct, instead criticizing the US for its 
"provocative" actions.(22)
*Former Yugoslavia. Since the beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia, Moscow has 
backed the regime in Belgrade and the armed factions it supported. Only after generous 
US inducements, and then only reluctantly, did Russia join the NATO-led peacekeeping 
force in 1995. Cooperation between the Pentagon and the Russian Ministry of Defense 
in Bosnia has been tangible, though a scandal in which Russian forces were caught 
spying on the NATO command in Tuzla has shown that old habits thrive. (23)
The foreign ministry's position has been more visibly adversarial. It has not joined the 
West in the diplomatic isolation of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. When the US 
worked to maintain sanctions, Moscow lifted sanctions on Serbia and on Bosnian Serbs 
imposed during a more cooperative era. (24) Primakov has impugned the legitimacy of 
the UN war crimes tribunal at The Hague, accusing it of bias against Serbs and warning 
against any attempt to apprehend indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, (25) while 
offering diplomatic support for Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic against an OSCE 
attempt to pressure him to respect the results of the November 17, 1996 elections. (26) 
Yet Milosevic's domestic opponents see Primakov's policy not as ethnic and cultural 
fraternity between Orthodox Slavs, but as ideological. Serbian opposition leader Vuk 
Draskovic denounced Primakov personally on Russian television, accusing him of 
supporting "the last Communist dictator in Europe."(27)
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*People's Republic of China. In September 1995, Primakov became Moscow's first 
intelligence chief to visit the People's Republic of China. The nature of his visit was not 
disclosed. As foreign minister, he considers building "strategic" relations with Beijing, 
beyond current mutually lucrative military and commercial ties, as a "very important 
priority." (28) The Ministry of Defense, however, has expressed strong apprehension 
about high-tech weapons sales to China and still views its Communist neighbor as a 
potential adversary.
In June 1996, Primakov's predecessor Kozyrev described the view that the West is 
Moscow's natural enemy as a "sinister Communist lie" that society had to overcome if 
Russia was to become a normal country. (29) Primakov has a different vision. The next 
day he delivered a speech published in Trud, pronouncing that Moscow should not be in 
such a hurry to join, in his words, "the club of civilized nations."(30)
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